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Abstract—This paper proposes a cooperative mechanism for
detecting potentially deceptive cyber attacks that attempt to
disregard average voltage regulation & current sharing in cyber-
physical DC microgrids. Considering a set of conventional cyber
attacks, the detection becomes fairly easy for distributed observer
based techniques. However, a well-planned set of balanced
attacks, termed as the stealth attack, can bypass the conventional
observer based detection theory as the control objectives are met
without any physical error involved. In this paper, we discuss
the formulation & associated scope of instability from stealth
attacks to deceive distributed observers realizing the necessary
& sufficient conditions to model such attacks. To address this
issue, a novel cooperative vulnerability factor (CVF) framework
for each agent is introduced, which accurately identifies the
attacked agent(s) under various scenarios. To facilitate detection
under worst cases, the CVFs from the secondary voltage control
sublayer is strategically cross-coupled to the current sublayer,
which ultimately disorients the control objectives in the presence
of stealth attacks and provides a clear norm for triggering defense
mechanisms. Finally, the performance of the proposed detection
strategy is simulated in MATLAB/SIMULINK environment and
experimentally validated for FDI & stealth attacks on sensors
and communication links.
Index Terms—DC microgrid, stealth attack, false data injec-
tion, distributed control.
I. INTRODUCTION
DC microgrids are an effective means of integrating re-newable energy sources, storage devices and modern
electronic loads, capable of operating independently of the
utility grid [1], [2]. Moreover, the operating nature of these
units in the DC paradigm makes it a vivid option to enhance
the efficiency [3]. For enhancing the scalability and robustness,
distributed controllers are desirable in microgrids [4], [5] to
avoid single point of failure as compared to the centralized
communication, owing to their highly reliable operation during
link failures. Moreover, distributed control philosophy is an
economic option since it can be easily accommodated by
transmitting lesser volume of data without entailing much
traffic in contrast to the centralized communication [6]. In
DC microgrids, cooperative secondary controllers have been
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deliberately used for various objectives such as average volt-
age regulation [7], proportional load sharing [8] and energy
balancing [9].
To enhance the scope of reliability, system security plays an
increasingly important role to maintain unbiased coordination
among the sources since it directly affects the technological
aspects based on penalties specifically allocated for poor
performance metrics [10]. Few potential ways to violate se-
curity measures are cyber attacks, which typically include
false data injection attacks (FDIAs) [11], denial of service
(DoS) [12], replay attacks [13], and others. Such attacks are
adept at disrupting the network stability as well as control
structures. Several instances have been reported in the past,
which became a critical concern for the control centers [14].
FDIAs alter the system state by injecting a false data into
any of the compromised sensors/actuators. An example of
implementation of such attacks is given in [11]. To analyze
the impact of such attacks, further investigation is done in
[15] to assess its impacts on the economic load dispatch that
is realized in a cooperative manner. In this respect, the system
under attack reaches a consensus stage which is not optimal.
Broadly, detection and mitigation of conventional attacks is
already well classified in the literature since such attacks
disrupt the operation of observers which becomes a simple
criteria for detection. However, it is reported that generalized
FDIAs, commonly known as stealth attacks [16], can easily
penetrate into networked systems without altering the system
observability. These attacks can be specifically classified as
coordinated intelligent attacks [17] which involves coordinated
attack vectors in multiple nodes to nullify system dynamics.
As a result, the system/agent operator would be unaware of
any online attack vectors present in the system. Prior to this,
the attacker could cause an unfair increase in the magnitude of
attack vectors which may cause system shutdown depending
upon the severity of the attack. Additionally, implementation
of such attacks gets easier when the attacker has obtained
apriori knowledge about the system using adequate system
monitoring [18]. More instance of coordinated attacks on large
power systems and its vulnerability assessment is provided in
[19], [20]. In this regard, risk assessment alongwith control
vulnerabilities is crucial since the modeling of coordinated
attacks for microgrids can be easier owing to their small
system size without significant security measures [21], [22].
In [23], the authors have identified aberrant operation of
a microgrid when a false data is injected into the voltage
controller of the substation. Apart from stability, it is also
crucial to analyze if the proposed strategies can attain eco-
nomic vulnerabilities in a microgrid. In fact, this attribute
is well addressed in [27] where the FDIAs are categorized
by their utilization levels having monitored the stability of
microgrids under different conditions. On the other hand, Beg
et. al. in [24] have stressed on the identification the varying
of candidate invariants to detect the presence of FDIAs.
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that stealth attacks in DC
microgrids can deceive the control system without creating
any negative impact/disturbance. However, it is crucial to
understand that such undetectable attacks, which are able
to penetrate while maintaining discretion, can cause network
instability in unforeseeable ways.
Since distributed observer based strategy [25] is more prone
to cyber attacks for a well-spanned distributed graph as the
injected false data propagates in the entire network, proper
analysis has to be carried out towards the detection of the
attacked agent in a microgrid to establish corrective action.
False data propagation in DC microgrids may lead to loss
of generality from an economic point of view, cause current
sharing errors, which lead to circulating currents between each
converter. Using distributed computation, the estimated states
will converge to a nonzero steady value under FDIAs, which
makes them simple to detect. In [28], the compromised agent
with false data is detected using a cooperative based trust
& confidence factors to realize mitigation of the propagation
of false data in the cyber network. However, considering the
worst case for such attacks, the abovementioned factors can
also be manipulated by adding/subtracting a large constant
value while the controller is attacked, which may lead to false
values corresponding to the attacked node. Consequently, it
will result in maloperation of the mitgation strategy, since
it operates on non-attacked agent(s). In [26], Fawzi et. al.
have determined a theoretical limit on the number of com-
promised sensors in a system beyond which it is impossible
to characterize the detection of such attacks. Considering
this view point, theoretical analysis for stealth attacks at
multiple sensors/actuators in a cooperative network to create
instability and the corresponding detection methodologies in
DC microgrids has not gained significant attention yet. On the
other hand, [29] have addressed this issue for an economic
dispatch problem as it decreases the overall efficiency with an
increase in the generation cost by dislocating towards a non-
optimal point. However, it does not administer a mechanism
for detection of the compromised agent during a stealth attack,
which is crucial to cease its propagation into the network and
may consequently lead to instability.
The idea behind stealth attack detection in this paper is
identification of the merits of a well-spanned network in
cooperative control mechanism. In particular, the difference
between the secondary output of voltage sublayer, termed as
cooperative vulnerability factor (CVF), converges to zero if
the system is not under attack. Furthermore, the necessary
and sufficient conditions for modeling of worst-case stealth
attack involving multiple sensors/communication links are
studied extensively. Moreover, the impact of FDI & stealth
attacks on sensors and communication links is studied for
intrusion in voltage and current information separately to
preserve system security and energy efficiency simultaneously.
Since the distributed control philosophy in DC microgrids
is based on voltage observer which can easily translate any
uncoordinated data injection with a residual output, the authors
have identified the concept of balanced attacks as stealth attack
modeling with further investigation on its detection. Based
on these findings, the CVFs of each agent determined from
the secondary voltage sublayer are strategically coupled into
the local current sharing secondary control loop. For this
reason, any subsequent disruption/attack necessarily disorients
the control operation of the agents, thereby serving as an
apparent detection criterion considering that the attacker may
attempt to manipulate CVF locally. On the other hand, the
agent(s) representing positive value of CVF is resolved as
attacked which suggests that their respective measurements
are untrue. This can be easily extended to trigger the likely
defense mechanisms to prevent further instability.
To sum up, the research contributions of this paper are:
1) To ascertain the possibility of FDI and stealth attacks
in DC microgrids, a new methodology based on a co-
operative vulnerability factor (CVF) is proposed using
the outputs from secondary sublayers used for global
average voltage regulation in DC microgrids. General-
ization of distributed observers is done to detect such
attacks and how it can be circumvented for a multiple
sensor/link based stealth attacks. For detection of the
compromised/attacked agent, CVF of each agent is lo-
cally monitored for positive values across the network
which represents the attacked agent(s). This technique is
used as an apparent method of detecting attacks locally
such that corrective actions can take place. To the best
of authors’ knowledge, CVF has never been proposed in
the realm of cyber attack detection in microgrids.
2) A new cross-coupling methodology of CVF output of
each agent from the secondary voltage sublayer is pro-
posed to strategically disorient the control operation for
the worst case of consecutive attacks when the attacker
can attempt to reduce CVF into a negative value so as to
deceive the abovementioned detection philosophy. Hence,
the cross-coupling approach ensures accurate detection of
the attacked agent(s) by prevention against further attacks
into the proposed detection metric, i.e., CVF.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
architecture of DC microgrids along with cyber layer pre-
liminaries providing an overview of the secondary control
strategy is illustrated in Section II. Section III depicts the prob-
lem formulation to demonstrate the behavior of cooperative
control strategy under FDI and stealth attacks. Moreover, the
necessary and sufficient conditions of modeling such attacks
with multiple sensors/cyber link have been discussed in detail.
Section IV provides a brief overview on the calculation of
the cooperative vulnerability factor for each agent and its
significance in the detection of such attacks. Simulations along
with experimental validation are presented in Section V & VI
respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Fig. 1. Generic cyber-physical model of DC microgrid: Blue arrows represent
the cyber layer and black lines represent the physical circuit.
II. CONVENTIONAL COOPERATIVE REALM IN DC
MICROGRIDS
A. Cyber-physical Model
The autonomous DC microgrid considered in this paper is
shown in Fig. 1. M DC sources connected via DC/DC con-
verters of equal power rating are inter-connected through tie-
lines, thereby constituting the physical layer of the microgrid.
Each DC/DC converter operates to maintain the output voltage
as per the reference values generated by the local primary
and secondary controller. An undirected cyber graph of the
communication network is considered in this paper, which
sends and receives information from its neighbors. Further,
loads are connected at the converter output of each unit. The
simulated system parameters have been provided in Appendix.
Considering each source as an agent, the communication
graph is represented as a digraph via edges and links via an
adjacency matrix A = [aij ] ε RMXM , which suggests the
communication weights to be
aij =
{
> 0, if (xi, xj) ε E
0, else
(1)
where E is an edge connecting two nodes, xi is the local node
and xj is the neighboring node. It is to be noted that the com-
munication weights depict information exchange between two
corresponding nodes only. Mathematically, it can be denoted
by a matrix with incoming information, Zin =
∑
i ε M aij .
Hence if both matrices match each other, the Laplacian matrix
L is balanced, where L = Zin−A and its elements are given
by
lij =

deg(mi) , i = j
−1 , i 6= j
0 , otherwise
(2)
where deg(mi) is the degree of ith node and L =
[lij ] ε R
MxM .
Remark I: All the units will achieve consensus using
x(k + 1) − x(k) = −µLx(k) for a well-spanned matrix L
such that lim
k→∞
xi(k) = c, ∀ i ε M , where c is a constant,
µ is a positive value and M is the number of agents in the
system.
B. Cooperative Control of Sublayers in DC Microgrids
The general philosophy of secondary cooperative realm in
DC microgrids is to maintain the average voltage globally
and share the currents proportionately using local as well as
neighboring measurements such that the circulating currents
can be reduced. These objectives are implemented using the
secondary control sublayers in a cooperative manner using:
1) Sublayer I : Average Voltage Restoration: For global
average voltage regulation in DC microgrids, an average volt-
age estimate V̄dci(k) for i
th agent is obtained using a voltage
observer, which is updated via a dynamic consensus algorithm
[30] using the neighboring estimates V̄dcj (k) ∀ jε Ni, where
Ni denotes the set of neighboring agents. Mathematically, it
can be represented for ith agent as
V̄dci(k + 1)− V̄dci(k) = Vdci(k + 1− τ io)− Vdci(k − τ io)
+
∑
jεNi
aij(V̄dcj (k − τ iin − τ
ij
d )− V̄dci(k − τ
i
in))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cooperative input
(3)
where Vdci(k), Ni, τ
i
in and τ
i
o denote the measured voltage,
set of neighboring agents, input and output delay [31] in ith
agent respectively. Moreover, τ ijd denote the communication
delay between ith & jth agent, ∀ j ε Ni. Alternatively, (3)
can be represented in the vector form as
V̄dc(k + 1)− V̄dc(k) = Vdc(k + 1− τo)− Vdc(k − τo)
+AV̄dc(k − τin − τd)− ZinV̄dc(k − τin) (4)
V̄dc(k + 1)− V̄dc(k) = Vdc(k + 1− τo)− Vdc(k − τo)
−L1V̄dc(k − τin − τd)− L2V̄dc(k − τin) (5)
such that L = L1+L2, where L1 =

0 l12 . . . l1M
l21 0 . . . l2M
...
...
. . .
...
lM1 lM2 . . . 0
,
L2 =

l11 0 . . . 0
0 l22 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . lMM
 .
2) Sublayer II : Proportionate Current Sharing: Similarly,
the normalized current regulation cooperative input for ith
agent using the neighboring output current measurements Idcj ,
∀ j ε Ni is given by
Īdci(k) =
∑
jεNi
ciaij(Idcj (k − τ jo − τ
ij
d )/I
max
dcj −
Idci(k − τ io)/Imaxdci ) (6)
where ci, Idci(k), I
max
dci
and Imaxdcj denote the desired coupling
gain, measured output current in ith agent, maximum output
current allowed for ith agent and jth agent respectively. To
establish these objectives for an agent operating to regulate
output voltage, two voltage correction terms for ith agent are
calculated using
∆V 1i (k) = K
H1
P (Vdcref − V̄dci(k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ei1(k)
+
KH1I
k∑
p=0
(Vdcref − V̄dci(p)) (7)
∆V 2i (k) = K
H2
P (Idcref − Īdci(k − τ
i
in))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ei2(k)
+
KH2I
k∑
p=τ iin
(Idcref − Īdci(p− τ iin)) (8)
where KH1P ,K
H1
I , K
H2
P ,K
H2
I are PI controller gains of H1,
H2 in Fig. 4 and Vdcref , Idcref denote the global reference
voltage and current quantities for all the agents respectively.
The correction terms obtained in (7)-(8) are finally added to
the global reference voltage Vdcref setpoint to achieve local
voltage reference V idcref for i
th agent using
V idcref (k) = Vdcref + ∆V
1
i (k) + ∆V
2
i (k) (9)
Remark II: Generally, the line impedances between each
agent in a microgrid are significantly different, which usually
introduces a poor current sharing profile using the primary
droop concept without using communication [8]. However,
by using (8), the voltage correction term ∆V 2i (k) from the
secondary controller compensates for the cable resistance as
well as carries out proportionate sharing under different load
conditions. As a result, the value of ∆V 2i (k) is globally
asymmetric in a microgrid with different tie-line resistances.
Remark III: Using the cooperative based consensus algorithm
for a well connected cyber graph for a DC microgrid, the
solutions in (3)-(6) shall converge to
lim
k→∞
V̄dci(k) = Vdcref , lim
k→∞
Īdci(k) = 0 ∀i εM (10)
It should be noted that Idcref in (8) has been kept zero for
the load currents to be shared proportionately. However for
false data-injection attacks in single sensor/communication
link, (10) modifies to
lim
k→∞
V̄dci(k) = V
a
dcref
, lim
k→∞
Īdci(k) 6= 0 ∀i ε M (11)
where V adcref 6= Vdcref . Assuming a pre-condition that the
system always operates at a certain global reference voltage
is known to each agent, (11) should be a sufficient criteria
to justify that the system is attacked by an external entity.
Many likely potential attacks on DC microgrids such as FDI
& DoS [32], jamming [33] and distributed DoS [34] attacks
have already been well studied in the literature. These attacks
can be caused using several cyber-physical amendments such
as jamming of cyber link, loss of measurements, data-packets
flooding, compromised communication servers, sensors, etc.
However, the authors in [32], [33] have already established that
such attacks disrupt the cooperative synchronization law [30],
which can be easily detected since (10) is violated. To provide
with a detailed explanation, the abovementioned disturbances
introduce an uncoordinated discontinuity in updating (5) which
disrupts the consensus between agents, ultimately leading to
(11).
Intuitively, the attacker conducting a stealth attack is able to
penetrate into the control system without the system operator’s
knowledge. Such attacks can have adverse effect in the long
run as the attacker has access to multiple nodes after penetrat-
ing into the system without system operator’s knowledge and
can create unintentional generation outage, which may even-
tually lead to system shutdown. Under these circumstances,
detection of the attacked node(s) in a cooperative network is
yet another aspect so as to prevent the system from further
instability. The modeling of such attacks and its associated
agenda of instability is discussed in detail in the following
section.
III. MODELING OF STEALTH ATTACKS IN COOPERATIVE
DC MICROGRIDS
Considering the attacker injecting false data into multiple
sensors/communication links to formulate a stealth attack, an
analysis of how the convergence in (10) can be guaranteed
is provided in this section. Furthermore, the necessary and
sufficient conditions to formulate a stealth attack on multiple
sensors in a cooperative network is given in detail.
For each agent, the local power balancing equation can be
expressed in terms of
χi(k) = Idci(k)− Ioi(k) (12)
where Ioi(k) denote the total output current from i
th agent
respectively. Using (12), the consensus algorithm in (3)-(6)
under attacks can be rewritten as:
V̄dci(k + 1) = V̄dci(k)−
∑
jεM lij V̄dcj (k − τ iin − τ
ij
d )
+σχi(k) + u
a
Vi
(k)
Idci(k + 1) = Idci(k)−
∑
jεM lijIdcj (k − τ jo − τ
ij
d )
+uaIi(k)
χi(k + 1) = χi(k)−
∑
jεM lijχj(k)−
(Idci(k + 1)− Idci(k))
where uaVi(k) & u
a
Ii
(k) denote the attack vectors imposed
into voltage & current secondary sublayer in ith agent at kth
instant respectively. It should be noted that since χi(k) is
not a physical measurement entity, the possibility of attack in
χi(k) will be entirely due to uaIi(k). To provide with the basic
understanding and investigating the effect of stealth attacks
in multiple sensors/links in a cooperative network based DC
microgrids (rated voltage of 315 V), a case study in Fig. 2 is
done by injecting a balanced set of zero sum errors s & −s
into the voltage sensors in Agent I and III respectively during
t = 1 s, where s is a constant attack element. After initiating
the attack, it can be seen that Īdc(k) and V̄dc(k) converge to
their respective references as stated in (10) with the control
objectives met satisfactorily without creating instability. Upon
maintaining discretion for some time, the attacker attempts an
unfair increase in the injected attack vectors by a large magni-
tude (highlighted as event A) at t = 2 s which results into a new
operating reference V adcref in (11). A time-gap of 1 s between
the stealth attack and event A is intentionally considered in
the case study to facilitate clear understanding. It should be
noted that the attacker may introduce event A immediately
at t = 1 s which necessitates a faster cyber attack detection
strategy. As the agents’ voltage ramp up to the highlighted
overvoltage threshold, agents I & III are automatically tripped
as a measure of overvoltage safety (highlighted as event B).
Hence, if a vigilant attacker manages to penetrate, such attacks
can lead to various unintentional scenarios without any trace
for failure assessment. This case study necessitates the study
of stealth attacks using multiple sensors/links along with an
authentic detection mechanism. As a consequence, we obtain
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of
system under such attacks in (13).
Problem Statement: If there exist a constant R such that
∞∑
k=0
|uaV (k)| ≤ R,
∞∑
k=0
|uaI (k)| ≤ R ∀ i ε M (13)
then (13) in the presence of stealth attack shall converge as
per (10) with lim
k→∞
χi(k) = 0.
Proof: Representing (13) in the form of xi(k+1) = Axi(k)+
Fig. 2. Case study I: Instability caused by injecting an attack consisting
of balanced set of zero sum error into the voltage sensors in DC microgrid
consisting of M = 4 agents.
Bui(k − τ iin), we have
xi(k + 1) = Axi(k) +Bui(k − τ iin) (14)
= Ak+1xi(0) +
k∑
p=τin
Ak−pui(p− τ iin) (15)
As A is primarily composed of Laplacian matrices in (13),
its eigenvalues lie around zero and unit plane [35]. Since
lim
k→0
∑k
p=τin
Ak−pu(p− τin) will converge to zero for a well-
connected graph, as per (10), lim
k→0
Ak+1x(0) should converge
to Vdcref d, where d =
[
1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0, 0, ..., 0
]T
ε R3MX1
with M elements equal to 1 and 2M elements equal to 0.
Hence, this proves the convergence of a stealth attacked system
to the global reference set-points in (10). 
Additionally, the abovementioned proof can be extrapolated
to justify ∑
i εM
Idci(k) =
∑
i ε M
Ili(k) (16)
under a stealth attack where Ili is the local load at i
th agent.
Due to (16), convergence of (12) is guaranteed. By the iterative
rule, subtracting Idci(k + 1) from χi(k + 1), we get∑
i ε M
χi(k + 1)−
∑
i ε M
Idci(k + 1) =
∑
i ε M
χi(k)−∑
i ε M
Idci(k)−
∑
i ε M
uaIi(k) (17)
=
∑
i ε M
χi(k − 1)−
∑
i ε M
Idci(k − 1)
−
∑
i ε M
(uaIi(k − 1) + u
a
Ii(k)) (18)
=
∑
i ε M
χi(0)−
∑
i ε M
Idci(0)−
k∑
p=0
∑
i ε M
uaIi(p) (19)
Substituting for Idci(k + 1) from (13) in (19) and taking
limitation on both sides considering (12) as k →∞,∀i ε M ,
we get
k∑
p=0
∑
i ε M
uaIi(p) = 0 (20)
A similar analysis can be carried out to determine the effect
of uaV (k) in the convergence of the algorithm to get
k∑
p=0
∑
i ε M
uaVi(p) = 0 (21)
using χi(k + 1) & V̄dci(k + 1) in (17).
Remark IV: Following the concept of cooperative synchroniza-
tion [30], the average voltage estimate in (5) tends to achieve
consensus for all its elements for a spanning cyber graph such
that LV̄dc(k) = 0 during steady-state to reach a steady-state
value of Vdcref 1. Alternatively, a similar representation can
be given using ei1(k) in (7) such that LE1(k) = 0 reaches
a steady state solution of zero, where E1(k) denotes the
vector notation of ei1(k). Using (21) as an attack vector for
the abovementioned consensus theory, it can be concluded
that the steady solution isn’t affected for E1(k) owing to the
Fig. 3. Performance of DC microgrid consisting of M = 3 agents for (a) FDI attack on current sensor of agent I and (b) stealth attack on current sensors of
agent I & II : Deteriorates current sharing profile.
consensus properties of a Laplacian graph [30]. Hence, it can
be concluded that the final state convergence as per (10) is
not affected even under stealth attacks since it gets nullified
by the sum of false data injection in multiple sensors/links for
a cooperative network as established in (20) & (21).
IV. PROPOSED STEALTH ATTACK DETECTION STRATEGY
This section discusses about the detection of the attacked
nodes in a cooperative network based DC microgrid. As op-
posed to the centralized systems where the global information
is present at a single node, it is a complicated task to apprehend
the attacked node in cooperative systems as intrusion in any
agent affects the entire system for a strongly connected graph.
To address the issue, this paper utilizes the concept of control
output synchronization to detect the attacked node in a coop-
erative network where the input signals with attack vectors are
deemed to achieve consensus. Following the convergence of
the inputs, it is shown how the difference in their respective
PI controller outputs achieves consensus for the same global
reference voltage.
Remark V: Since output current from an agent, as shown in
Fig. 1, is based on the voltage levels between two different
points, a stealth intrusion in the agents’ current values for
operation at a particular load leads to change in voltage levels
across the network thereby disproving (10). In simple terms,
it can be stated that the agent can recognize such attacks
as it would result in the current sharing error. Such error
may in turn cause undesirable effects such as overloading
of individual converters or reduced energy efficiency. This
has been justified by a case study in Fig. 3 for FDI and
stealth attack on current sensors in a DC microgrid shown
in Fig. 1 of M = 3 agents. In Fig. 3(a), a false data of -
0.5 A is injected into the current sensor in Agent I at t =
1 s which immediately results into improper sharing thereby
reducing energy efficiency. Similarly, in Fig. 3(b), a stealth
attack is attempted at t = 1 s by injecting a balanced set of
zero sum attacks of ± 0.5 A into the current sensors in agent
I & II simultaneously which deteriorates the current sharing
profile. However, the average voltage is still maintained in
Fig. 3(b) in contrast to the case for FDI attack. With the
basic assumption that each agent operator bears knowledge
that the system is equipped with proportionate current sharing
controller, the sharing error shown in Fig. 3(a) & (b) should be
a sufficient criteria to identify attacks on current sensors such
that corrective action can take place. Hence, it becomes an
easier task to determine such attacks in a cooperative network.
However, stealth attacks on voltage sensors in case of multiple
sensors/communication links can be inconspicuous to identify.
In other words, the agent voltages are maneuvered in such a
way that the control operation in (10) still holds true even in
the presence of such attacks.
Using Remark V, the control input for voltage regulation
is particularly used to present a strong case for stealth attack
in this paper. Hence, the control input for average voltage
regulation [36] at ith agent is given by
ui(k) =
∑
jεNi
aij(V̄dcj (k)− V̄dci(k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
uij(k)
+bie
i
1(k) (22)
For various attacks in ith controller, the attacked control input
can be modeled as
Sensor attack: ufi (k) = ui(k − τ
i
in) + κu
a
i (k) (23)
Cyber link attack: ufij(k) = uij(k − τ
ij
d − τ
i
in) + κu
a
i (k) (24)
where κ = 1 denote the presence of attack vector or 0, other-
wise and uai (k) denotes the attack vector in i
th agent. By local
investigation of ufi (k) in each agent, non-zero synchronization
error can be detected with residual output, however, it’s not
a sufficient criteria for detection of the attacked node(s) in a
cooperative network since comparison of each residue requires
global information which contradicts our case. To verify this
case, the effort of the controller to synchronize the output for
a given reference voltage is strategically used to indicate the
Fig. 4. Proposed controller for ith agent to detect attack on sensors and communication links in DC microgrids.
occurrence of attack. It can be ensured using (3) & (7) in
sublayer I to give
ξi(k) = u
f
i (k)− ui(k − 1) (25)
for an attack within [k−1, k] instant which changes due to the
momentary increase/decrease in (25) as input for the attacked
agents & its neighbors at the instant of attack vector injection
in multiple sensors/cyber links in a microgrid. As a result, the
change in PI output in sublayer I can be written as
δ∆V 1i (k) = K
H1
P ξi(k) +K
H1
I u
f
i (k) (26)
where δ∆V 1i (k) = ∆V
1
i (k)−∆V 1i (k− 1). Using the change
in outputs obtained in (26), a cooperative vulnerability factor
(CVF) Ci(k) is calculated using the PI controller outputs for
each agent, which has been used in this paper to determine
the attacked nodes accurately. Mathematically, it can be rep-
resented as
Ci(k) = hi [
∑
jεNi
aij(∆V
1
j (k − τ
ij
d )−∆V
1
i (k))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
oi1(k)
[
∑
jεNi
aij(∆V
1
j (k − τ
ij
d ) + ∆V
1
i (k))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
oi2(k)
(27)
for ith agent, where hi is a positive constant. Moreover, using
(7) & Remark IV, we get
∆V1(k+1)−∆V1(k) = (KH1I +K
H1
P )E1(k+1)−K
H1
P E1(k)
(28)
where ∆V1(k) denotes the vector notation of ∆V i1 (k) in (7).
Since sublayer I operates as a secondary controller to achieve
asymptotic convergence, KH1I << K
H1
P such that the time
constant of the secondary layer PI controller (KH1P /K
H1
I ) is
at least 20 times higher than the outer voltage controller in
Fig. 4 to provide smooth response [37], (28) can be rewritten
using Remark I as
∆V1(k+1)−∆V1(k) = E1(k+1)−E1(k) = −
1
KH1P
LE1(k) = 0
(29)
Using (29) and Remark IV, it can be concluded that coop-
erative synchronization law [30] holds true in the absence of
attacks. However in the presence of attacks, (29) synchronizes
to a non-zero value which varies on the magnitude of injected
attack vector. The above action can be justified by observing
each secondary sublayer output in Fig. 5 for a stealth attack on
multiple voltage sensors on agent II & III in a DC microgrid
of different line resistances. It can be seen that the voltage
correction terms from average voltage sublayer in Fig. 5(a)
change symmetrically as compared to current sharing sublayer
in Fig. 5(b) following a stealth attack at t = 1 s. This attribute
can be explained using Remark II. Considering the system
operating at steady-state, a step change of balanced zero sum
attack uai (k) is injected into two agents during (k − 1)th
instant, (26) can be represented as
∆V 1i (k) = K
H1
P u
a
i (k) +
k∑
p=τ iin
KH1I (ui(p− τ
i
in)) +
k∑
p=(k−1)
KH1I (u
a
i (p))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γi(p)
(30)
Eliminating the first two terms in RHS of (30) using Remark
IV & substituting (30) in (27), it can be concluded that
oi1(k) and o
i
2(k) will always lead to positive/negative values
due to Γi(k) for a balanced sum zero attack only on the
attacked nodes. As a result, Ci(k) of the attacked nodes
will always reflect a positive value. This provides a sufficient
criteria for the detection of the attacked nodes in case of
multiple sensor/link based stealth attack in DC microgrids.
Concluding the above discussion, the cooperative vulnerability
factor algorithm for each agent will result into
Ci(k) =
{
0 , if κ = 0
> 0 , else
(31)
However, under worst cases, Ci(k) can also be manipulated
by the attacker using subtraction to make it negative, which
Fig. 5. Case study II: Performance of (a) average voltage regulation and (b) current sharing for a strong case of stealth attack on voltage sensors of agent II
& III.
displeases our attack detection criteria. To handle these dis-
crepancies, Ci(k) is tactically added to ei2(k) in (8), which
can now be rewritten as
Fig. 6. Variation of C1 for different values of the design parameter h1.
∆V 2i (k) = K
H2
P (Idcref + Ci(k)− Īdci(k − τ
i
in))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ēi2(k)
+
KH2I
k∑
p=τ iin
(Idcref + Ci(k)− Īdci(p− τ iin)) (32)
such that the control operation will be disoriented locally,
thereby allowing the agents to reliably detect the attacks. Since
Idcref = 0, the cross-coupling of the CVF suggested in (32)
will supplement to accurate detection and facilitates protection
against attacks on CVF since Ci(k) now forms the forward
path between both secondary control sublayers. By doing so,
further attacks on Ci(k) will disorient the objectives laid down
for the outer voltage controller in sublayer I since it disregards
(10). The CVF output Ci(k) when cross-coupled into sublayer
II introduces a ramp signal into its input. The ramp up/down
of Ci(k) can be explained using the addition of the term Γi(k)
in (30), which ramps up/down indefinitely for k →∞ unless
the positive/negative attack vector is removed from ith agent.
Hence, the ramp up/down of Ci(k) in the positive region
qualifies as a sufficient criteria for the corresponding node
to be declared as attacked in the cooperative realm for DC
microgrids.
Moreover in Fig. 6, it can be seen that the slope of C1(k)
increases with increase in h1 for a particular stealth attack
in two sensors. As the ramping up/down of Ci(k) is already
established above, the steady state error eiss(k) for the ramp
input Ci(k) =
∑k
p=0 hip in the error term ē
i
2(k) in (32), when
introduced into the PI controller in sublayer II with the unity
feedback output yi(k) can be calculated using
eiss(k + 1)− eiss(k) = [yi(k + 1)− yi(k)]−
[Ci(k + 1)− Ci(k)] (33)
eiss(k + 1)− eiss(k) = K
H2
P e
i
ss(k + 1)−K
H2
P e
i
ss(k) +
KH2I e
i
ss(k + 1)− [Ci(k + 1)− Ci(k)] (34)
eiss(k + 1)− eiss(k) = K
H2
P e
i
ss(k + 1)−K
H2
P e
i
ss(k)
+KH2I e
i
ss(k + 1)− hi (35)
eiss(k + 1)[1−K
H2
P −K
H2
I ] = e
i
ss(k)[1−K
H2
P ]− hi (36)
Since the abovementioned analysis is based on steady state
conditions, eiss(k + 1) u eiss(k). Using this approximation in
(36), we get
eiss(k) =
hi
KH2I
(37)
Hence, (37) implies that for higher values of hi with constant
KH2i , the system may quickly lead into unstable zone owing to
high steady state error considering bounded stability whereas
for lower values of hi, it is difficult to determine the attacked
node under worse scenarios of stealth attack due to slow
ramping. Since the main focus of the paper is to detect
the attacked unit accurately alongside prevention of further
coordinated attacks, it is a seemingly fair approach to include
the cross-coupling strategy such that the defense mechanism
can take place immediately without disrupting stability for
lower values of hi.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Fig. 7. Considered system: (a) Agent model and (b) Cyber-physical DC
microgrid with four sources.
The proposed attack detection strategy is tested on a cyber-
physical DC microgrid as shown in Fig. 7(b) with Vdcref = 315
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 8. Proposed detection strategy for case study I in Fig. 2: (a) without
input, output & communication delay, (b) with delay(maximum value in
the network): τin∆t = 1 ms, τo∆t = 3.5 ms, τd∆t = 45 ms, (c) with
delay(maximum value in the network): τin∆t = 1 ms, τo∆t = 3.5 ms, τd∆t
= 80 ms, where ∆t is the sampling time.
V consisting of four agents of equal capacities interconnected
to each other via resistive lines. It should be noted that
each agent consists of a battery accompanied via DC/DC
bidirectional converters respectively as shown in Fig. 7(a).
To test the performance of the proposed attack detection
strategy for cooperative DC microgrid, it has been tested
against several disturbances such as FDIA, stealth attack in
multiple sensors, which usually goes undetected by distributed
observers, communication links to detect the affected node
such that necessary action can be taken to maintain security.
The system & control parameters are provided in Appendix.
It should be noted that each event in the abovementioned
scenarios are separated by a certain time-gap to provide clear
understanding.
A. Behavior of Proposed Stealth Detection Strategy for Case
Study I
For case study I in Fig. 2, the behavior of the proposed
strategy without considering input, output & communication
delay is shown in Fig. 8(a). As the stealth attack is initiated at
t = 1 s in agent I & III, the values of C1 & C3 rises up into
the positive region suggesting those agents to be the attacked
units. Further, the performance of the proposed strategy in
response to case study I is tested with input, output(within
the agent) & communication(between two agents) delays in
Fig. 8(b) & (c). It should be noted that input & output delays
are constant whereas communication delays are time-varying
[31]. As the distributed control law for DC microgrids provides
rugged response to delays due to the dynamic averaging
concept within an upper bound on the communication delay
for a given well-spanned network [36], the philosophy of the
proposed detection strategy under delays will be unaltered if
the cooperative synchronization law in Remark IV holds true
for the underlying control layer. As compared to Fig. 8(a),
it can be seen that the CVF of the attacked agents initially
rise with different peak magnitudes under delays of τin∆t =
1 ms, τo∆t = 3.5 ms, τd∆t = 45 ms & 80 ms(∆t is the
sampling time) in Fig. 8(b) & (c) respectively, which can
be attributed to varying delay in achieving consensus due to
delayed measurements & inputs. It is worth notifying that the
results in Fig. 8(b)-(c) have been investigated for maximum
value of delay in the network to test the robustness of the
proposed strategy. Since the CVF values of the affected agent
goes instantly into the positive region in Fig. 8(a)-(c), it can
be concluded that the proposed strategy entails faster detection
of stealth attacks even under delays.
B. Scenario I
In scenario I, the voltage sensor in agent I is attacked with
ua1 = - 7 V at t = 1 s. As a result, due to the presence of
distributed voltage observer designed for each agent in (5),
the average voltage estimate in Fig. 9 immediately dips to
313 V for each agent. Assuming that the reference voltage of
operation is known to every agent, the error in average voltage
estimate should serve as a sufficient criteria to detect the
presence of FDIA in the system. However, the identification
of the attacked agent still remains a question. This paper
has dealt with this issue by observing Ci(k) in (27), which
always converges to zero in the absence of attacks. In this
case, it can be seen that the average voltage estimates do
achieve consensus however, they synchronize to a different
value V adcref . When the PI output of voltage sublayer change
symmetrically as shown in Fig. 5(a), o1(k) in (27) becomes
comparatively apparent for the attacked node(s). Consequently,
C1, as shown in Fig. 9, rises upto 0.05 as per the proposed
strategy which suggests that either sensors/links in agent I are
maltreated with an attack. Prior to detection of the attacked
node, a corrective measure is taken at t = 1.5 s where
the outgoing links from agent I are deactivated. With link
deactivation, it can be seen that the average voltage estimate
restores back to 315 V. Another advantage with the proposed
strategy is that it acts as a worthy index to denote if the injected
false data is still active with the agent. When the injected false
data is removed by the attacker at t = 2 s, C1 immediately
goes to zero. Since the system is secure, the deactivated link
is restored back.
C. Scenario II
In scenario II, the outgoing cyber links from agent III is
attacked with a set of attack vectors of ± 3 V at t = 1 s
Fig. 9. Scenario I(a) Currents, (b) Voltages, (c) CVF, (d) Average voltages: False data injection attack on voltage sensor at t = 1 s in agent I. As seen, the
average voltage dips on initiating FDIA. It is shown that the CVF of agent I instantly shoots into the positive region to detect the affected agent.
Fig. 10. Scenario II(a) Currents, (b) Voltages, (c) CVF, (d) Average voltages: Stealth attack on two outgoing cyber links at t = 1 s from agent III. It is shown
that the average voltage estimates diverge symmetrically on initiating the attack. The proposed strategy accurately detects the attacked agent.
such that the cumulative effect seen in a cooperative network
is zero. Prior to initiating the attack, it is difficult to denote
the attacked node from the average voltage estimate as both
estimates diverge symmetrically. Considering this problem
using a distributed observer based approach, norm of these
errors would mistranslate into two attacked nodes, i.e., agent
III & IV. This issue is well addressed using the proposed
approach since C3 as shown in Fig. 10 shoots up to 0.18
thereby suggesting that agent III is attacked. As a protective
measure of security, the outgoing links from agent III are
deactivated which brings the average voltage estimate into
synchronism by tracking the desired reference value of 315 V.
For load changes highlighted as A & B, the system performs
satisfactorily. To test the robustness of the proposed approach
under worse case scenarios, another consecutive attack at t = 2
s is preempted by the attacker to manipulate C3 by reducing it
to a negative value. However, due to cross-coupling of Ci(k)
into sublayer II in (32), it prevents further exploitation as
it can’t disorient the nested control output for a particular
operating point.
D. Scenario III
In scenario III, a balanced attack of ± 10 V in sensors of
agent I & IV respectively at t = 1 s is practiced in Fig. 11
to test the fidelity of the proposed approach. As C1 & C4
shoots up in the positive region, agent I & IV are plugged
out of the system at t = 1.5 s. Based on Assumption 2 in [28],
the network connectivity is affected due to plugging out of
M /2 agents which leads to change in system dynamics. On
clearing out of the attack at t = 3 s indicated by C1 & C4
dropping to zero, the converters are plugged back in around
Fig. 11. Scenario III(a) Currents, (b) Voltages, (c) CVF: Stealth attack on voltage sensors of agent I & IV at t = 1 s. Upon initiating the attack, the average
voltages and current sharing remain intact. As seen, the proposed strategy identifies the attacked agents instantly with the CVF for agent I & IV in the positive
region.
t = 3.2 s resulting into restoration of the average voltage
estimates to 315 V.
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Fig. 12. Experimental setup of DC microgrid comprising 2 agents.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed strategy has been experimentally validated
in a DC microgrid comprising 2 agents as shown in Fig.
12. Two lead acid battery banks, where each bank consist
of 3 batteries in series for an overall input voltage of 36
V, are connected to the loads via DC/DC boost converters
of equal capacities and tie-lines operate to achieve average
voltage regulation & share the load current proportionately
among themselves. The analog measurements received from
Hall effect transducers, LA 25-P and LV 20-P from each agent
is acquired via two local controllers equipped with Xilinx
board as highlighted in Fig. 12. Agent I is controlled using
a National Instruments sbRIO 9683 chassis (Target I) with
embedded data acquisition card sbRIO 9606. On the other
hand, source II is controlled using a NI PXIe-8840 (Target
II) with data acquired using NI PXIe 7853R series boxes and
the control algorithms are implemented in LabVIEW which
provides a GUI to produce respective gating signals for both
the converters. The sensor attacks on the voltage sensors were
modeled using (23). The experimental testbed parameters have
been provided in Appendix.
A. Scenario I
In Fig. 13(a), when a false data of ua,11 = 3 V is injected
into the voltage sensor in agent I during event A, it leads to
an increase in the voltage observer output. Consequently, the
voltage of agent II also increases from 48.1 V to 51.6 V. This
results into increase of C1 from 0 to 0.2 V which ensures
the attack vector in agent I. After a certain instant, when the
link from agent I is deactivated which halts the propagation
of false data during event B, agent II voltage returns back to
48.1 V. However, the injected false data is still effective which
is evident from C1 in Fig. 13(a). Under the worse case, the
attacker may try to manipulate C1 into the negative region
such that the disabled link is restored. In event C, another
attack vector ua,21 = -1.2 V is injected into C1, which doesn’t
affect its detection philosophy as it is strategically oriented
into the control system of each agent using the cross-coupling
methodology.
B. Scenario II
Similarly in Fig. 13(b), a stealth attack is modeled by
injecting a balanced set of zero sum vectors ufi = ± 3 V into
voltage sensors of both the agents prior to event A. Following
the transient, both the voltages return back to their respective
set-points before attacks. However, C1 & C2 increase from 0 to
0.2 V which suggests that both agents are attacked. To prevent
further damage, a corrective action by disabling the cyber links
during event B in Fig. 13(b) results into local operation for
each agent.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a general cyber attack detection frame-
work for cyber-physical DC microgrids. The vulnerability of
the conventional cooperative techniques in DC microgrids
under false data injection is investigated in detail. In addition
to that, the modeling of stealth attacks, which manage to
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Fig. 13. Experimental validation of (a) FDIA, and (b) stealth attack on voltage sensor(s) in a DC microgrid with M = 2 agents. The experimental results
validate the proposed findings.
deceive distributed observers is carried out using necessary
and sufficient conditions. To address this issue, a cooperative
vulnerability factor algorithm is presented which operates on
the PI output of the voltage observer to track changes for
each agent so as to provide an accurate identification strategy
of the attacked agent(s). To add fidelity, it is cross-coupled
with the secondary current sublayer such that it operates under
worst scenarios of attacks. Its robustness is evaluated using
both simulation and experimental results for both false data
injection and stealth attacks on multiple sensors/links.
APPENDIX
Simulation Parameters
The considered system consists of four sources rated
equally for 3 kW. It is to be noted that the line parameter
Rij is connected from ith agent to jth agent. Moreover, the
controller gains are consistent for each agent.
Plant: R12 = 1.3 Ω, R13 = 1.8 Ω, R23 = 1.2 Ω, R43 = 1.5 Ω
Converter: Li= 3 mH, Cdci= 250 µF, imaxb1 = i
max
b2
= 9.5 A
Controller: Vdcref = 315 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 3, K
H1
I =
0.01, KH2P = 4.5, K
H1
I = 0.32, GV P = 2.8, GV I = 12.8,
GCP = 0.56, GCI = 21.8, h =1, c = 0.4
Experimental Testbed Parameters
The considered system consists of two sources with the
converters rated equally for 350 W. It should be noted that
the controller gains are consistent for each agent.
Plant: r1 = 0.25 Ω, r2 = 0.325 Ω, x2 = 30 µH , Li= 3 mH,
Cdci= 100 µF
Controller: Vdcref = 48 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 240.6, K
H1
I =
1.6, KH2P = 4.5, K
H1
I = 0.08, GV P = 0.07, GV I = 4, GCP =
0.02, GCI = 19.4, h = 1, c = 0.4
REFERENCES
[1] R H Lasseter, ”Smart distribution: Coupled microgrids” in Proceedings
of the IEEE, vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 1074–1082, 2011.
[2] T Dragicevic, X Lu, JC Vasquez, JM Guerrero, ”DC microgrids - Part I:
A review of control strategies and stabilization techniques”, IEEE Trans.
Power Elect., vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 4876-4891, 2016.
[3] L. Meng, T. Dragicevic, JM Guerrero and JC Vasquez, ”Dynamic
consensus algorithm based distributed global efficiency optimization of
a droop controlled DC microgrid”, Energy Conference (ENERGYCON),
2014 IEEE Intl., pp. 1276-1283, 2014.
[4] M. Yazdanian and A. Mehrizi-Sani, “Distributed Control Techniques in
Microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 2901–2909,
2014.
[5] S. Sahoo and S. Mishra, ”An Adaptive Event-Triggered Communication
Based Distributed Secondary Control for DC Microgrids”, IEEE Trans.
Smart Grid, 2017, DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2017.2717936
[6] T Dragicevic, X Lu, JC Vasquez, JM Guerrero, ”DC microgrids - Part
II: A review of power architectures, applications, and standardization
issues”, IEEE Trans. Power Elect., vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 3528-3549, 2016.
[7] V. Nasirian, S. Moayedi, A Davoudi and F. L. Lewis, “Distributed
Cooperative Control of DC Microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Power Elect., vol.
30, no. 4, pp. 2288–2303, 2015.
[8] S Anand, BG Fernandes, and JM Guerrero, ”Distributed control to
ensure proportional load sharing and improve voltage regulation in low-
voltage DC microgrids.” IEEE Trans. Power Elect., vol. 28, no. 4, pp.
1900-1913, 2013.
[9] T Morstyn, H Branislav and GV Agelidis, ”Cooperative multi-agent
control of heterogeneous storage devices distributed in a dc microgrid”,
IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 2974–2986, 2016.
[10] C. K. Veitch, J. M. Henry, B. T. Richardson, and D. H. Hart, ”Micro-
grid cyber security reference architecture,” Sandia Nat. Lab.(Hierarch.
SNLNM), Albuquerque, NM, USA, Tech. Rep. SAND2013-5472, 2013.
[11] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, ”False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Security,
vol. 14, no. 1, p. 13, 2011.
[12] G. Liang, J Zhao, F Luo, SR Weller and ZY Dhong, ”A Review of False
Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems”, IEEE Trans.
Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1630–1638, 2017.
[13] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler, and F. Bullo, ”Attack detection and identifica-
tion in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, vol. 58,
no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[14] Y Yan, et al., ”A survey on cyber security for smart grid communica-
tions”, IEEE Comm. Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 998-1010,
2010.
[15] P Li, et al., ”A Robust Distributed Economic Dispatch Strategy of
Virtual Power Plant Under Cyber-Attacks”, IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform.,
2018, DOI: 10.1109/TII.2017.2788868
[16] J Zhao, L Mili, and M Wang, ”A Generalized False Data Injec-
tion Attacks Against Power System Nonlinear State Estimator and
Countermeasures”, IEEE Trans. Power Sys., 2018, DOI: 10.1109/TP-
WRS.2018.2794468
[17] S Sridhar, M Govindarasu, and CC Liu, ”Risk analysis of coordinated
cyber attacks on power grid”, Control optimization methods for electric
smart grids, pp. 275–294, Springer, 2012.
[18] J Salmeron, K Wood, R Baldick,”Analysis of electric grid security under
terrorist threat”, IEEE Trans Power Syst., vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 905–912,
2004.
[19] Z Li, M Shahidehpour, A Alabdulwahab, and A Abusorrah, ”Bilevel
Model for Analyzing Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks on Power
Systems”, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 2260–2272, 2016.
[20] Y Chakhchoukh, and H Ishii, ”Coordinated Cyber-Attacks on the
Measurement Function in Hybrid State Estimation”, IEEE Trans. Power
Sys.,vo. 30, no. 5, pp. 2487–2497, 2018.
[21] SD Manshadi, and ME Khodayar,”Resilient Operation of Multiple
Energy Carrier Microgrids”, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 5,
pp. 2283–2292, 2015.
[22] MM Rana, L Li, and SW Su,”Cyber Attack Protection and Control of
Microgrids”, IEEE Journ. Automat., vol. 5, no. 2, 602–609, 2018.
[23] J. Hao, E. Kang, J. Sun, Z. Wang, Z. Meng, X. Li, and Z. Ming, ”An
adaptive markov strategy for defending smart grid false data injection
from malicious attackers,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 9. no. 4, pp.
2398–2408, 2018.
[24] O. Beg, T. Johnson, and A. Davoudi, ”Detection of false-data injection
attacks in cyber-physical dc microgrids,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform., vol.
13, no. 5, pp. 2693–2703, 2017.
[25] D Ding, et al., ”Observer-based event-triggering consensus control for
multiagent systems with lossy sensors and cyber-attacks”, IEEE Trans.
Cyber., vol. 47, no. 8, pp. 1936-1947, 2017.
[26] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi, ”Secure estimation and control for
cyber-physical systems under adversarial attacks,” IEEE Trans. Autom.
Control, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 1454–1467, June 2014.
[27] H Zhang, et al, ”Distributed Load Sharing under False Data Injection
Attack in Inverter-Based Microgrid”, IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., 2018,
DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2018.2793241
[28] S. Abhinav, H Modares, FL Lewis, F Ferrese and A Davoudi, ”Syn-
chrony in Networked Microgrids under Attacks”, IEEE Trans. Smart
Grid, 2017, DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2017.2721382
[29] C. Zhao, J. He, P. Cheng, and J. Chen, ”Analysis of consensus-based
distributed economic dispatch under stealthy attacks,” IEEE Trans. Ind.
Electron., vol. 64, no. 6, pp. 5107–5117, 2017.
[30] M Zhu, and S Martinez, ”Discrete-time dynamic average consensus”,
Automatica, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 322–329, 2010.
[31] X Xu, and G Feng, ”Consensus of Discrete-Time Linear Multiagent
Systems With Communication, Input and Output Delays”, IEEE Trans.
Autom. Control, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 492–497, 2018.
[32] O Beg, LV Nguyen, T Johnson, and A Davoudi, ”Signal Temporal Logic-
based Attack Detection in DC Microgrids”, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
2018, DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2018.2832544
[33] P Danzi, C Stefanovic, L Meng, JM Guerrero, and P Popovski, ”On the
Impact of Wireless Jamming on the Distributed Secondary Microgrid
Control”,arXiv preprint: 1609. 07368, 2016.
[34] X Zhong, L Yu, R Brooks, and GK Venayagamoorthy, ”Cyber Security
in Smart DC Microgrid Operations”, 2015 IEEE Intl. Conf. DC Micro-
grids (ICDCM), pp. 1–6, 2015.
[35] RA Brualdi, and JR Herbert, ”Combinatorial matrix theory”, vol. 39,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
[36] S Sahoo and S Mishra,”A Distributed Finite-Time Secondary Average
Voltage Regulation and Current Sharing Controller for DC Microgrids”,
IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2017, DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2017.2737938
[37] S Mishra, S Sahoo and A Dugar,”Hybrid MVMO based controller
for energy management in a grid connected DC microgrid”, Power,
Communication and Information Technology Conference (PCITC), 2015
IEEE, pp. 114-119, 2015.
Subham Sahoo (S’16-M’18) received the B.Tech. &
Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineer-
ing from VSS University of Technology, Burla, India
and Electrical Engineering at Indian Institute of
Technology, Delhi, New Delhi, India in 2014 & 2018
respectively. He has worked as a Visiting Student
with the Department of Electrical and Electronics
Engineering in Cardiff University, UK in 2017. He
is currently working as a Research Fellow in the
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
in National University of Singapore.
His current research interests include microgrids, cyber security, coordinat-
ed control and stability of cyber-physical systems.
Sukumar Mishra (M’97-SM’04) is a Professor at
Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi and has
been part of IIT Delhi for the past 15 years. He
has published over 200 research articles (including
papers in international journals, conferences and
book chapters).
Prof. Mishra has won many accolades throughout
his academic tenure of 25 years. He has been a
recipient of INSA medal for young scientist (2002),
INAE young engineer award (2009), INAE silver
jubilee young engineer award (2012) and has recent-
ly won the Samanta Chandra Shekhar Award (2016). He has been granted
fellowship from many prestigious technical societies like IET (UK), NASI
(India), INAE (India), IETE (India) and IE (India) and is also recognized as
the INAE Industry Academic Distinguish Professor. Currently, Prof. Mishra
is holding the position of Vice Chair of Intelligent System Subcommittee
of Power and Energy society (PES) of IEEE. Apart from all research and
academic collaborations, Prof. Mishra is very actively involved in industrial
collaborations. Prof. Mishra is currently acting as INAE Chair professor
and has previously delegated as the NTPC and Power Grid Chair professor.
He is also serving as an Independent Director of the Cross Border Power
Transmission Company Ltd. and the River Engineering Pvt. Ltd.
Prof. Mishra’s research expertise lies in the field of Power Systems, Power
Quality Studies, Renewable Energy and Smart Grid. Prof. Mishra is currently
serving as an Editor for the IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid and an Associate
Editor for the IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution journal
Jimmy Chih-Hsien Peng (M’04) is currently an
Assistant Professor of Electrical and Computer En-
gineering at the National University of Singapore,
Singapore. Previously, he was a faculty at the Mas-
dar Institute (now part of the Khalifa University),
United Arab Emirates. In 2013, he was appointed as
a Visiting Scientist with the Research Laboratory of
Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Massachusetts. He later became a Visiting
Assistant Professor at MIT in 2014.
He currently serves as the secretary for IEEE
Power and Energy Society Working Group on High-Performance Computing
for Power Grid Analysis and Operation. He is also a committee member
for Singapore Standard SS 535. His research interests include power system
stability, cyber security, microgrids, and high-performance computing.
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